Putin's New Military Epicenter? The Military Strategic Import of Putin’s Chechen Visit in Reinforcing the Putin-Kadyrov Alliance
Kadyrov is the new Prigozhin! Putin personally strengthens his regime's alliance with Ramzan Kadyrov with a trip to Chechnya as Russia faces Ukrainian incursions on Kursk.
Introduction:
The strategic alliance between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov has become increasingly significant. The recent visit by Putin to Chechnya, the first in over a decade, on August 21, 2024, has included a tour of the Russian Special Forces University and public appearances with Kadyrov. This trip underscores the strengthening relationship between the two and the ever-growing role of Chechen forces in Russia's military operation on Ukraine.
August 2024 Putin Visit to Chechnya:
Despite periodic reports of Ramzan Kadyrov’s declining health and several familial scandals throughout this year, Putin's military reliance on and collaboration with Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov remains strong. Putin's visit this week has included several notable stops, the first being a public outing with Kadyrov in Akhmat-Yurt, the ancestral village of Chechnya’s first president.1 Putin was additionally given a tour of the Russian Special Forces University, located east of Grozny and Southwest of the town of Gudermes. At the Russian Special Forces University, Putin was shown what appears to be a live fire drill2, was given a tour of a table full of wearable military gear3 and held a meeting with special forces commanders and volunteers4.
Putin then spent time in Grozny city proper, where he was shown elaborate plans for the construction of a new district in Grozny, to be named after Putin.5
Significance of Putin’s Trip to Chechnya:
The political-military relationship between Putin and Kadyrov is highlighted by this rare public engagement. Putin relies increasingly on Kadyrov for military strength via the forces housed and trained in Chechnya at the Special Forces University he has visited. This reliance has blossomed since the Wagner Group—formerly a key element of Russian operations in Ukraine—has faced disruptions and redeployments to other global outposts following the Wagner Mutiny orchestrated by Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023. Russian forces increasingly depend on the pool of Special Forces graduates from Chechnya’s Special Forces University, a reliance intensified in immediate history by Ukrainian incursions on Russia’s Kursk region.
In return, Kadyrov depends on Putin for the continued autonomy to govern Chechnya. With Putin's support, Kadyrov maintains a highly personalized rule, effectively operating Chechnya like a fiefdom. This arrangement allows Kadyrov to exhibit his power publicly, such as through the posting of videos showing his son torturing prisoners, through receiving the green light to execute Palestine protestors with no federal repercussions for extra-judicial killings and appointing his 16-year-old son to a trustee position at the Russian Special Forces University.
The strengthening of this reliance comes just as Ukraine has begun pushing further into Russia’s Kursk region. According to an ISW assessment on Aug. 20, 20246, Ukraine maintains advancements in the Kursk and sees success in the destruction of Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment. Western sources tend to indicate that Putin has been slow in responding to the situation in Kursk, and argue that several Russian elites indicate displeasure with Putin’s response. While Putin faces these new pressures, he has been engaging in several rounds of Defense Ministry purges throughout 2024, citing waste and corruption as his reasoning for these purges.7 With political and military pressures resultant of the situation in Kursk, paired with Defense Ministry purges, Putin’s troubles compound. In light of this compounded political-military struggle, Putin leans into a relationship of dependence with Ramzan Kadyrov and commemorates the strengthening of this relationship with the trip to Chechnya.
The Context of Putin-Kadyrov Engagements in Recent History:
Recent engagements between Putin and Kadyrov have emphasized Chechnya’s role in Russia’s ‘Special Military Operation’, with the Kremlin documenting a meeting between the two in late February.8 Fascinatingly, the Kremlin has not posted much about this February meeting, stating only “The discussion focused on the socioeconomic development of the region and its contribution to the special military operation.” This is entirely uncharacteristic of the Kremlin’s website, which posts moderately robust Kremlin coverage of Putin public meetings, speeches and written decrees or announcements. For example, the Putin-Kadyrov September 2023 meeting on the Kremlin website includes The Kremlin’s reporting of Kadryov’s remarks to Putin about the success of Chechen troops in Ukraine and cites the ability of his soldiers to capture prisoners and destroy Ukrainian equipment (mentioning Abrams tanks explicitly). The coverage of the September 2023 meeting9 suggests there is no particular reason for the Kremlin to suddenly be subtle about Putin’s reliance on Chechen-trained forces for operations in Ukraine, though there are several speculations that may be drawn from the brief, non-detailed nature of the Kremlin post on the February 2024 meeting. It is to be seen what the Kremlin and Putin himself will divulge about this August visit to Chechnya, and the growing reliance on Chechen-trained forces for Putin’s war in Ukraine.
https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3089
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https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3094
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/
http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/regions/CE/events/73537
http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/146/events/72377