Operational Infeasibility Unlikely to Deter Further Russian Escalations in Ukraine
I wrote this at the start of Putin's invasion of Ukraine. I argued military operational infeasibility would not deter Putin from further aggression due to the structure of the Russian central regime.
Political scientists have long argued that military operational infeasibility is oft a source of surrender for belligerent states. While this can be true in many contexts, the relative importance of military operational infeasibility compared to other political, economic, or psychological factors in variously-structured polities can mean that military-operational infeasibility does not persuade a belligerent state towards surrender or de-escalation. I argue that while Putin’s blitzkrieg has been largely unsuccessful and that his regime should be convinced of the operational feasibility of taking over Ukraine, the military infeasibility of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine are unlikely to yield a Russian surrender due to the structure of the Russian central regime under Putin.
Political Scientist, Luttwak, argues about the importance to conflict analysts of the operational level of war-the level (see fig 1). It is at this level of analysis where military infeasibility is important, given that the ability to deploy combinations of tactics successfully is the key to achieving broader strategic objectives. At the operational level, the Russian campaign in Ukraine aimed for a blitzkrieg: a short victorious war where large concentrations of Russian forces attack Ukraine from multiple sides, capture the capital, and act faster than Ukrainian defenses can mobilize to defeat and seize control of Ukraine. This did not happen: the highly resolved Ukrainian forces along with an equally resolved citizenry and civil society responded with grit, as did the international community via sanctions and military aid. Though there is reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of sanctions alone on deterring Putin’s belligerence- and even the military aid which may have been more effectual if bestowed on the Ukrainians before the onslaught began- these international shows of support reify Ukrainian ground-force morale and resolve. Though the conflict is ongoing, the blitzkrieg decapitation outcome inarguably did not occur for Russian forces and it is becoming increasingly clear that Ukrainians are capable and resolved to mount an enduring defense. Despite this operational failure and the increasingly long-term operational infeasibility of capturing Ukraine, Russian forces trek on with escalatory, pernicious and (according to manysources) increasingly indiscriminate ground operations.
In response to the question of ‘what can cause belligerent states to surrender,’ Political Scientist Pape uses World War II as an exemplary case of military strategic infeasibility lending to surrender- in this case on the part of Japanese forces. Pape specifically argues that Japanese military leaders’ recognition that they were militarily incapable of holding the home islands, their premier territory at issue, in relation to the United States was the operational infeasibility that resulted in their surrender. Pape uses this case to support the theory that relative military vulnerability lending to military operational infeasibility is a source of state surrender. (Pape 1993)
Military operational infeasibility will not, I argue, have the effect of persuading a Putin regime surrender or de-escalation in Ukraine, despite the aforementioned theory of military infeasibility as an instigator of surrender. This mechanism is not effective, reasonably, among regimes where the decision-makers have less incentive to care about the military feasibility or costs of continued warfare. The structure of the Russian regime engenders special conditions in which military feasibility of continued escalations or warfare is of little to no importance in warfare operation decision-making.
The differences in the political-military-decision-making structures of Japan at the end of WWII and modern Russia lend to varying strategic logics. At the time of surrender, Japan was an oligarchy composed of 3 primary governmental components (in order of relative power): the military, civilian leadership, and Emperor Hirohito. Within the military, the Japanese army represented a dominating decision-making force at the national level. A key component of the Japanese state was the existence of a legitimate military institution that had a distinguished culture and set of objectives relative to, for example, civil society institutions or the executive. This legitimate military institution with sufficient insulation from non-military-related interests and objectives allowed for operational feasibility to be a legitimate concern for the Japanese state. In simpler terms: there was a Japanese military that was not controlled by non-military political influences, and thus made decisions that are sensical from a military-operational perspective. (Pape 1993)
The modern Russian state possesses key structural differences which render regard for military-operational considerations minutely relevant relative to the interests and objectives of Putin himself. In ‘The Code of Putinism’, political scientist Taylor rightly argues that Russia is ruled, not governed, via a system of informal clan networks- of which Putin acts as boss as opposed to ‘president’. Taylor explains this system with a comparison of the central regimes of the US and Russia: while the president of the US is also the most important player in the policy process, the U.S. system has a system of institutional weights and counterbalances based on long-defined and refined legal frameworks and processes that create and support institutions (as opposed to figureheads).
Meanwhile, Russia is a ‘hybrid state’ ‘governed’ via some institutions, but largely via clan networks. ‘Clan networks’ refers to informal groups of actors who share common history, goals, interests and loyalty; that engage in exchanges and dealings to create ‘networks’ of informal relations that cross state, business, security, or institutional lines. The Russian state is heavily governed by this informal clan network structure, with Putin himself acting as the driving force of policy decisions in the network- especially with regard to Russian foreign policy (i.e. wars). Even top figures such as the ministers of defense or foreign affairs are more accurately regarded as “decision-takers”, not “decision-makers.” Given this lack of institutional insularity and the superimposition of Putin’s own interests throughout the cross-institutional network of the ‘decision-takers’ which comprise the high-ranking officials of the Russian state: military operational feasibility considerations are insignificant relative to Putin’s personal political interests. (Taylor 2018)
Here is a visual representation of the key structural differences between Japan during WWII and modern-day Russia which are relevant to whether military infeasibility is likely to induce surrender or de-escalation:
The consequence of the logic I have outlined is that, even as circumstances become increasingly dire for Russian ground forces, the infeasibility of invasion operations in Ukraine are unlikely to alter Putin’s aggression. In theory, even with this network of interaction, the Russian state could be deterred by operational infeasibility without an insulate military institutional network- in the event that Putin himself is convinced of the infeasibility of continued operations. However, it is unlikely for Putin himself to decide to de-escalate or surrender even if he is convinced of operational infeasibility. This is likely to be true given Putin’s political interest of maintaining an image of tough adversarial with the West, among other political-historical arguments Putin touts such as his expressed view of Ukraine as rightful territory of Russia.
Putin does not care about whether it is feasible, operationally, to take Ukraine. Even if the Russian military sees severe troop depletion, the regime will simply shift further into an air-dominant campaign strategy (as it has already begun to do). Russian military leaders, despite the clear operational infeasibility, do not have the liberty to make decisions that are not compatible with Putin’s goals- which include maintaining his regime, presenting himself as a strong adversary to the West, and terrorizing Ukraine into submission (prevent Ukraine from joining the EU or NATO) to maintain a geopolitical buffer zone between Russia and the democratizing Eastern Europe.
While military-operational infeasibility is largely insignificant to Putin’s decisions for ongoing operations, being convinced the political infeasibility of continued operations is much more likely to steer Putin toward de-escalation. The main driver of Putin’s decision-making is his own interest in maintaining his regime, so efforts to rupture that regime maintenance are likely to be more coercive drivers of de-escalation in Ukraine. For example, instances of internal dissent (among the Russian population or within Putin’s clan network) would be a more persuasive deterrent of further Putin aggressions than military infeasibility. This is not to say that strong Ukrainian defense responses are not key, because they are. Though my logic supposes that the goal of such defenses, in the interest of Russian de-escalation or surrender, is to convince non-Putin Russian actors and Russian military rank-and-file of the infeasibility of further invasive action in the hopes of fomenting Russian dissent or loss of capacity/resolve.
Works Cited:
Pape, Robert. 1993. “Why Japan Surrendered.” The MIT Press 18(2).
Taylor, Brian. 2018. The Code of Putinism. Oxford University Press.